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COMMENTS
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR INSIDER
TRADING: ELKIND v. LJGGE7T & MYM2RS
NC.
Rule 10b-5 was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission' to protect the investing public by promoting full disclosure of inside information.2 Under the rule, a corporate insider in
possession of material inside information concerning a security has
a duty to disclose such information or abstain from trading in or
recommending the security.3 Breach of this duty renders the corI Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
its rulemaking power under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
2 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974). The Second Circuit has stated that the purpose of rule 10b-5 is to promote full disclosure, thereby insuring that all investors are able to make informed judgments. Id. One
commentator has noted that there are at least eight recognized purposes underlying the
rule, but all revolve around providing investors with equal access to inside information. 5 A.
S. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 § 6.01 at 1-132 (1980).
3 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Although the Second Circuit has held that anyone in possession of material inside information is subject to the disclose or abstain standard, 401 F.2d at
848, the Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), refused to extend the standard to a printer who, in the course of his employment, obtained information
concerning a takeover bid and purchased stock in the target company. 445 U.S. at 224-25.
The Chiarella Court held that "such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to a transaction." 445 U.S.
at 230; accord, In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). Corporate insiders have
a duty to disclose by virtue of their obligation to place the shareholders' welfare above their
own. 445 U.S. at 230. Tippees, by the nature of their relationship with the insider, would
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poration liable to uninformed private investors' who traded in the
security during the period of nondisclosure.5 Once liability is established, however, measurement of damages is uncertain because few
courts have reached the issue.' Nonetheless, upon considering several damage standards, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.7 recently held

that uninformed purchasers may recover any post-purchase decline
in the market value of their shares occurring within a reasonable
time after learning of tipped information or after its public disclosure." The court, however, limited total recovery to the tippees'
gain from any pre-disclosure trading.9
In 1971 and in the first quarter of 1972, Liggett & Myers, Inc.
(Liggett) experienced record earnings. 10 Liggett's earnings began to
falter in April of that year, however, and on July 17, 1972, poor
year-to-date earnings were reported to Liggett's board of directors.11 Also on July 17, Liggett's chief financial officer "grudgingly"
affirmed an analyst's suggestion that Liggett's earnings were off
still be liable under the Chiarellastandard. Id. at 230 n.12. See generally Note, Rule 10b-5
and the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It Takes A Thief, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93
(1980).
Rule 10b-5 does not specifically provide for a private right of action, but such actions
consistently have been implied by the courts. The first court to recognize an implied private
right of action under rule 10b-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800
(E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Following the lead of the lower courts,
the Supreme Court also has consistently recognized an implied private right of action. E.g.,
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
5 Pursuant to rule 10b-5, the theory underlying liability in nondisclosure cases is that
when an insider trades in a corporate security while in possession of material inside information, he has caused injury to uninformed investors. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)). But see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 31819 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (insider trading causes no injury to
persons trading on the open market).
6 3 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrIEs LAW: FRAUD § 9.1, at 225 (1977). Since far more decisions
on the existence of the cause of action have been decided in favor of plaintiffs, defendants
have been quick to settle upon terms which generally are unpublished. Id. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
7 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
8 Id. at 172.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 159. Liggett's earnings for 1971 were $4.72 per share, up from $3.56 in 1970.
Similar earnings were recorded in the first quarter of 1972. Id.
11 Id. at 160. In the first six months of 1972, Liggett's earnings were $1.46 per share,
down from $1.82 the previous year. Id.
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from the previous year. 2 Pursuant to this "tip," and prior to full
public disclosure of Liggett's
earnings on July 19,"3 1800 shares of
14
Liggett stock were sold.
As a result of the tip, Liggett was found liable by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York for disclosure of material inside information in violation of rule 10b-5.15 Considering
the measure of damages, the district court held that Liggett was
liable for the out-of-pocket loss of all persons who purchased stock
during the period of nondisclosure, 16 that is, the difference between
the price they actually paid and what the stock would have been
7
worth had the tipped information been disclosed.
12

Id. at 161.

11

Id. Liggett's board of directors issued a press release at 2:15 p.m. on July 18. Id. at

173. Published in the Wall Street Journal, the release effectively was disclosed on the following day. Id.
1 Id. at 161. Upon receiving a tip concerning faltering Liggett profits, a stock market
analyst promptly wired his firm to report his findings. Id. The wire was not overly pessimistic, but recommended that shares at the current price be held and that aggressive buying be
curtailed. Id. at 161 n.7. Nevertheless, 1800 shares of Liggett stock promptly were sold pursuant to the wire. Id. at 161.
15 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd and
remanded, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). Although the district court found Liggett liable for
two tips, 472 F. Supp. at 128, liability for one of the tips was reversed by the Second Circuit.
635 F.2d at 158.
1 472 F. Supp. at 129. The district court was bound to find Liggett liable to all traders
during the period of nondisclosure because of the Second Circuit's opinion in Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974). In Shapiro, the court stated that it would make "a mockery of the 'disclose or abstain' rule if we
were to permit the fortuitous matching of buy and sell orders to determine whether a duty
to disclose has been violated." Id. at 236 (citation omitted). One court has suggested that at
least in the case where the insiders themselves are trading, the class of plaintiffs should be
limited to those trading "contemporaneously" with the defendant. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542
F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
In Fridrich,Judge Celebrezze suggested that only these traders are protected by the disclose
or abstain rule because it is only when the insiders are trading that the rule is violated. 542
F.2d at 326. Judge Celebrezze agreed with the Shapiro rationale in tipping cases, however,
because they involve a more widespread imbalance of information posing a much greater
threat to the marketplace which could only be remedied by disclosure. Id. at 327 & n.12.
But see Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC
Rule 10b-5: A Commentary, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 67, 98-100 (1977) (recommending that the
Celebrezze concurrence be adopted as a "rational limitation" on defendants' "potentially
limitless liability"); Note, Rule 10b-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common
Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 76, 99-100 (1975) (suggesting that class actions be discouraged by reintroducing such concepts as proximate cause and reliance in open market cases).
17 472 F. Supp. at 129. The district court used two different methods to determine the
value of stock purchased by plaintiffs. In its initial opinion, the court used the value line
method. Id. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text infra. The court later amended its opinion because the value line originally constructed by the plaintiffs was based on an alleged
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed Liggett's liability for
the tip, but rejected the district court's out-of-pocket measure of
damages.1 8 Out-of-pocket damages are inappropriate when tippees
merely trade on inside information, the court reasoned, since such
conduct does not amount to a fraud perpetrated directly upon the
plaintiff.'9 Moreover, the court recognized that the out-of-pocket
formula could expose defendants to damages "out of all proportion
to the wrong committed. ' 20 The Elkind court also noted the difficulty of establishing one element of the out-of-pocket equation-the "value" that the stock would have had assuming full disclosure of the tipped information.2 1 Indeed, the court rejected two
methods other courts have used to make this determination.2 2 The
use of expert testimony to construct a "value line" was considered
by the court to be "hypothetical" and "speculative. ' 23 The alternative use of an actual post-disclosure market price as a nunc pro
tunc indicator of pre-disclosure value also was rejected because it
assumed "parity" between the content of the tip and public
disclosure.24
An alternative measure of recovery noted by the Elkind court
would permit uninformed investors to recover any erosion in the
market price of the stock which directly resulted from the tippees'
wrongful conduct.25 Although this "causation-in-fact" approach
has the advantage of limiting recovery to the damage actually
caused by the defendant's activities, it was rejected by the Second
Circuit because it imposes an impossible burden on plaintiffs to
prove when, and the extent to which the integrity of the market
breach of duty to disclose for which the court did not find the defendant liable. 472 F. Supp.
at 131. In its amended opinion, the court relied upon the cover method used by the Tenth
Circuit in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971). The cover method consists of the difference between the purchase price
and the lowest market price within a reasonable period after the investor should have become apprised of the facts. 472 F. Supp. at 132; see notes 40-41 and accompanying text
infra.
18 635 F.2d at 157.

19 Id. at 170. But see Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
20 635 F.2d at 170.
21 Id.; see note 35 and accompanying text infra.
22 635 F.2d at 170; see notes 36-39 and accompanying text infra.
21 635 F.2d at 170.
214Id. The Elkind court

was skeptical whether the market would react similarly to disclosed information at two different times even in cases where there was parity between the
content of the tip and the disclosure. Id.
25 635 F.2d at 171.
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was affected by the tippees' conduct.26 Furthermore, the court
stated, such an erosion in price could be considered an injury to
the plaintiffs as shareholders, not purchasers, thus barring recovery under rule 10b-5.
Recognizing that all damage measures are somewhat imperfect, the Second Circuit held that successful private 10b-5 plaintiffs properly could recover any post-purchase decline in the market value of their shares, but limited such recovery to no more
than the defendant's gain. 2s The court noted several advantages
associated with this "disgorgement" approach. By making tippers
and tippees liable for the amount gained as a result of their misconduct, the court noted that disgorgement would deter further insider trading while barring windfall recoveries.29 Additionally, the
court stated that disgorgement avoids problems of proof since
plaintiffs merely would have to establish the purchase price of
their securities; the market price of the securities at a reasonable
time after public diclosure, or after the plaintiffs learned of the
tipped information, whichever occurred first; and the fact that reasonable persons would not have paid the purchase price had the
tipped information been disclosed.3 0 Finally, the court concluded
that in most cases the damages recoverable under a disgorgement
standard would correspond to the injury caused by the tippees' illegal conduct.3"
26 Id.

Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)). The Blue
Chip Court held that shareholders who suffer losses in the value of their investment due to
corporate insider activity concerning the purchase or sale of securities are barred from being
plaintiffs in a rule 10b-5 action. 421 U.S. at 738. It is submitted that the Elkind plaintiffs, as
purchasers during the period of nondisclosure, would be entitled to recovery under the causation-in-fact approach because it is merely a method of measuring loss and does not establish standing to sue. The Elkind court did not consider this to be a problem in defining
disgorgement, a measure which uses a similar formulation. 635 F.2d at 172.
28 635 F.2d at 172.
27

29

Id.

Id. In holding that recovery should be based on the price of the security after the
plaintiff learned of the inside information or after its public disclosure, whichever occurred
first, it is submitted that the Elkind court reverses what should be the correct holding.
Recovery should be based on the price when there is public disclosure or when the plaintiff
discovers the information, whichever is later. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1703 (h)(1) (1980); 6 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1630 (2d ed. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549,
Comment c (1977). The only way a person could learn of the undisclosed information before
public release probably would be through a tip. In such instances, the parties could subject
themselves to possible liability if they tried to trade their shares.
21 635 F.2d at 172. The court stated that when tippees sell only a few shares, the likell20
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It is submitted that the disgorgement standard of damages
used by the Second Circuit, while uniquely limiting liability, is
similar in many respects to other damage measures. In adopting
disgorgement, however, the Elkind court improperly may have dismissed such other measures. Additionally, because disgorgement
focuses primarily on a defendant's gain rather than on a plaintiff's
loss, it ignores the compensatory purpose of implied private 10b-5
actions and diminishes their deterrent effect. Nevertheless, by employing a disgorgement standard, the Second Circuit has addressed
a troublesome element of other damage measures: the imposition
of excessive liability upon defendants.
OTHER MEASURES OF RULE 1OB-5 DAMAGES

When determining damages for rule 10b-5 violations involving
insider trading in the open market, courts have relied on either the
out-of-pocket or cover measures of damages. The out-of-pocket
award is measured by the difference between the value of the thing
bought, sold, or exchanged, and its purchase price.32 Borrowed
from the common-law tort concept of fraudulent misrepresentation, the measure entitles a defrauded plaintiff to recover the actual loss sustained as a result of the defendants' wrongful conduct.3 3 In cases of fraudulent face-to-face transactions, the actual
hood of substantial injury to uninformed outsiders is small. On the contrary, when tippees
sell large amounts of stock realizing substantial profits, the likelihood of injury is large. This
position is contrary to the causation-in-fact principle upon which liability for nondisclosure
is based. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
11 E.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Madigan,
Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977). The out-of-pocket rule of damages frequently is cited
by courts which, nonetheless, proceed to use other measures. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Sandia
Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 989-91 (E.D. Pa. 1969); see Note, The Measure of Damages in
Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 383-85 (1974).
One court has stated that section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb
(1976), which prescribes recovery under the act as "actual damages on account of the act
complained" requires the use of the out-of-pocket measure. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F.
Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); cf. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645
F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) (any form of compensatory damages, even benefit of the bargain, is appropriate under section 28(a)); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (section 28(a) only prohibits the use of punitive damages).
One commentator has suggested that section 28(a) may invalidate the use of noncompensatory damages provided for by such measures as disgorgement. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1980).
11 Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
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value of the property can be determined by its market value on the
date of the transaction.- 4 In the open market situation, however,
the market price of a security will not reflect its actual value because the effect of undisclosed information will not be accounted
for.3 5 Therefore, courts have fashioned two methods of calculating
actual value. One method is to construct a value line showing the
price the stock would have sold for on each day of the tipping period had the tipped information been disclosed." This involves the
determination and elimination of various market and firm-specific
factors unrelated to the tip in order to isolate the change in price
attributable solely to the fraudulent activity.3 7 The second method
uses the market price on the date the fraud is discovered as an
indicaor of the actual value of the stock on the day of the plaintiff's purchase. s One court employing this nunc pro tunc approach
stated that on such a date the market will reflect the true value of
the stock unaffected by the defendant's fraud. 9
UAffiliated

Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155-56 (1972); Harris v. Ameri-

can Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549, Comment c (1977).
3 Mills v. Electric Auto-lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247-48 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 922 (1977); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969); 5B A.S. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RuLE 1On-5 § 260.03 [i][iii], at 11-166 to -167
(1980).
36 E.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556 (5th Cir. 1981); Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
'7 Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afld, 556 F.2d 554 (2d
Cir. 1977); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Note, The
Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 371, 385-86 (1974). For a theoretical model using the value line method, see id. at 38697.
The Elkind court rejected the value line as "hypothetical" and "speculative." In so
doing, the court seemingly failed to consider the validity of the use of expert testimony to
determine damages in other contexts. In wrongful death cases, for example, experts consistently have been called upon to determine both the decedent's life expectancy, through actuarial tables, and potential earnings, through the use of many intangible figures such as job
performance and inflation. E.g., Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349, 1351 (2d
Cir. 1974); HuddelU v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 83 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds,
537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). Moreover, the use of expert testimony to determine potential
corporate profits is an accepted practice in breach of contract for sale cases. E.g., Autowest,
Inc. v. Peugot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1970); Liberman v. Nagel, 316 F.2d 214,
223 (9th Cir. 1963). It is submitted that the determination of the actual value of a security,
which involves a similar analysis, is no more hypothetical and speculative, and could have
been used in the Elkind case.
38 E.g., Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1054 (1976); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1971); 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 228; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549, Comment c (1977).
11 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
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An alternate measure of damages has been referred to as the
"cover" measure. Simply stated, this measure awards the defrauded purchaser the difference between his purchase price and
the lowest price of the security within a reasonable time after the
investor should have become aware of the true facts.40 The purpose
of this award is to fix a date at which time a reasonable investor
should become aware of his loss and be in a position to prevent
further losses.41
In defining disgorgement, the Elkind court retained several
principles of both the out-of-pocket and cover measures. Thus, the
Elkind disgorgement formula allows recovery for any postpurchase decline in the market price of a security within a reasonable time after full disclosure of tipped information.42 In this respect, disgorgement is similar to both the cover and out-of-pocket
nunc pro tunc formulas. All three approaches set plaintiff's recovery at the difference between the price paid for securities and the
price of such securities at some period after disclosure. 43 The pe-

riod after disclosure within which a price is to be selected and the
criteria for determining such post-disclosure price, however, vary
among the three approaches. With respect to determining a postdisclosure period, both the cover and disgorgement measures allow
It is suggested that although the Elkind court properly rejected the nunc pro tunc method
of determining damages, it disregarded the principal deficiency with this approach. By failing to account for the numerous market variables, other than the tip, which could affect the
price of the stock during the period of nondisclosure, the nunc pro tunc valuation approach
places the entire risk of loss in market price during this period on the defendants-a risk
which the defendants neither caused nor assumed. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp.
1372, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1977). The Elkind court noted that
under disgorgement the defendants would assume the risk that "the market price may reflect disclosure of information more adverse than the tip and other adverse market conditions." 635 F.2d at 173 n.29.
40 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 132, rev'd and remanded, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1703(h)(1) (1980).
41 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969). Upon learning of a fraud, the extent of the plaintiff's loss caused by the defendant becomes known to him. Therefore, any further loss would not be attributable to the
wrongful conduct of the defendant. 446 F.2d at 105; 402 F.2d at 104-05.
42 635 F.2d at 172.
43 Cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980) (disgorgement);
Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054
(1976) (out-of-pocket nunc pro tunc); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 10405 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (cover).
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recovery for any post-purchase decline within a reasonable time
after disclosure. 44 The out-of-pocket nunc pro tunc measure, on
the other hand, sets a price immediately upon disclosure.45 With
respect to setting a post-disclosure price, both the out-of-pocket
nunc pro tunc and disgorgement methods use the market price at
the time disclosure is deemed to have occurred, whereas the cover
measure uses the lowest market price within the post-disclosure
period. 46 Because of such differences, the recovery obtainable
under these measures is inconsistent. For example, on July 17, the
day of the tip in Elkind, Liggett stock closed at 55
on the New
York Stock Exchange.47 Additionally, the price on July 19, the day
of disclosure, was 46 /. 1 Under the out-of-pocket nunc pro tunc
measure, the award would be based on the difference between
these prices. 49 Because the tipped information was effectively,
hence reasonably, disseminated on the same day as the public disclosure, the Elkind court also used a disclosure price of 46 /.50
The district court, ostensibly employing the cover award, however,
used 43, the lowest price within 8 days after disclosure.5 1 The court
considered such a period sufficient for a reasonable investor to become aware of the information.52 Although the actual difference
which resulted in Elkind was insignificant, such would not necessa'4 See 635 F.2d at 172 (disgorgement); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90,
105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (cover).
" See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
" Compare Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980) (disgorgement) and Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976) (out-of-pocket nunc pro tunc) with Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104-05 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (cover).

47

635 F.2d at 173.

48

Id.

41 Id.
In the initial decision in the district court, wherein a value line method was applied, see notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra, the actual value of stock purchased by
plaintiffs was found to be $41. 472 F. Supp. at 129. This finding had to be rejected, however,
because it was based on counts for which the court subsequently found no liability. Id. at
131.
o 635 F.2d at 173. Although the price differential obtained under the out-of-pocket or
disgorgement tests may be identical, it bears repeating that the total damages recoverable
probably will differ. Thus, under the out-of-pocket formula, damages will be calculated by
multiplying the price differential times the number of shares purchased by the plaintiffs.
Under the disgorgement formula, however, damages will be determined by multiplying the
price differential times the number of shares traded by the defendants.
81 472 F. Supp. at 133.
82 Id. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971), the Tenth Circuit allowed 9 trading days as a reasonable time to discover
the fraud, overruling the 17 days allowed by the district court. 446 F.2d at 105.
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rily be true in all instances. Indeed, in cases where tipped information is not quickly publicized, or where the stock market experiences substantial fluctuation after disclosure, the difference could
be considerable.5 3 Therefore, it is submitted that, if a post-disclosure price is to be used, selection of an average price within a reasonable period after disclosure may be the most equitable solution.
PURPOSES OF PRIVATE IMPLIED RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS

It is submitted that the Elkind disgorgement measure disregards the compensatory purpose and undermines the deterrent
value of private 10b-5 causes of action. Typically, when courts
have implied a cause of action for violation of a statute, the purpose of such implication has been to compensate those persons injured by the behavior in derogation of the statute." To the extent
that the Elkind disgorgement measure lessens the relationship between the plaintiffs' loss and the damages imposed, however, it ignores any compensatory objective.5 5 Since, as in Elkind, disgorge"'Under the facts in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), the difference which would result from the use of alternative
damage valuation measures is significant. The average price of the stock on the date the
public became aware of the disclosure was $42.75. Using the highest price during the reasonable reinvestment period, however, the Tenth Circuit based its recovery on a price of $59
per share. See Note, Securities Regulation - Damages for SEC Rule lOb-5 Violations The Measure of Damages Caused by False and Misleading Statements is the Difference
Between the Plaintiff's Selling Price and the Highest Daily Price Attained During a Reasonable Reinvestment Period, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.
1971), 49 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1144-45 nn.15-17 (1971).
" Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1970); id. at 407-08
(Harlan, J., concurring); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916); Katz, The
Jurisprudenceof Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 17-31 (1968); Rapp, supra note 16, at 91.
5" Dooley, supra note 32, at 21-22. In the Dooley article, written before the Second
Circuit's opinion in Elkind, the author indicated that the circuit's opinion in Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), left open the
possibility that a "court would be free to find that defendants' violation had caused one
kind of injury (the open market purchasers investment losses) and to award damages based
on a wholly unrelated theory (forfeiture of profits)." Dooley, supra note 32, at 21-22. In
Shapiro the court stated that gain is an element to be considered in determining the appropriate relief. 495 F.2d at 242. Cf. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973) (gain may be considered in determining liability).
Disgorgement, while possibly being a deterrent, but see notes 56-59 and accompanying
text infra, generally will be insufficient to compensate those injured by the defendants' misconduct. See Rapp, supra note 16, at 91-92; Note, Rule 10b-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 76, 79 (1975). Rule 10b-5 could
not have real significance as a protective device without a private right of enforcement
which is compensatory in nature. Rapp, supra note 16, at 91.
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ment may result in damages grossly inadequate to compensate
plaintiffs, the effect will be to render such actions unattractive to
potential plaintiffs. Moreover, since gain has not been considered a
prerequisite to liability, 5 it is inconsistent to consider it a prerequisite to recovery. Indeed, the practical effect is that, without gain,
a finding of liability would become a Pyrrhic victory. The real inquiry, therefore, should focus upon the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Although the Elkind court suggested that the disgorgement
measure would be an effective deterrent to insider trading, 57 it is
submitted that its deterrent effect is questionable because it fails
to promote two principal means of deterrence: the likelihood of incurring liability and the threat of severe punishment once liability
is imposed.5 8 The likelihood of incurring liability merely on the
strength of private implied 10b-5 actions had been minimal even
before disgorgement due to the difficulty and expense involved in
proving liability. 9 Disgorgement, of course, does not ameliorate
these problems. Moreover, because the threat of severe punishment is lessened by the damage-limiting aspect of disgorgement, it
is submitted that disgorgement will not serve to restrain insider
trading.6 0
"6 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 750 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, § 8.5 (584), at 208.47 to .48.
5' 635 F.2d at 172. The Securities and Exchange Commission consistently has maintained that disgorgement is an effective deterrent to insider trading. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities FraudActions Brought By the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641, 649. Ellsworth
suggests, however, that the Commission's position in this respect may be based on.its desire
to "dispel the notion" that the Commission is bringing the action to redress private inves-

tors. Id.
"s Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF CIME
AND PUNISHMENT 55-56 (G. Becker & W. Landes eds. 1974).
59 Dooley, supra note 32, at 16-17. Due to the difficulty of establishing 10b-5 liability,
private actions have been largely "parasitic," seeking compensation only on the strength of
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. The parasitic nature of private
causes of action under rule 10b-5 is evidenced by the fact that private parties have initiated
actions in only five cases. Id. at 16 n.82. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972); Lilly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio Pension Fund, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,769 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 608 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1979);
Pearlman v. Poloraid Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,652
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Matarese v. Aero-Chatillon Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bubolz v. Burke, 266 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
60 See Dooley, supra note 32, at 22-26.
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THE ADVANTAGES OF LIMITING LIABILITY

Viewed in the context of the current trend in 10b-5 jurisprudence, the Elkind disgorgement measure may represent a welcome
middle ground between the purposes of the rule and the effect of
implied private actions. The potential effect of the expansion of
civil liability to the area of insider trading in the open market is
massive liability. Such an effect has led courts and commentators
to devise methods which would limit a defendant's liability. 1 Indeed, one court, reasoning that insider trading would not injure
persons buying and selling on the open market, absolved the defendants in a case factually indistinguishable from Elkind. 2 By
shielding defendants from excessive liability, the Second Circuit's
disgorgement measure is a less drastic attempt to limit plaintiff
recoveries. Furthermore, it appears that excessive liability is responsible, in part, for the recent trend by the Supreme Court to
curtail the expansion of private rights of action under rule 10b-5
and circumscribe the rights of plaintiffs.63 No attempt has yet been
61 "[T]he possibility that damages may be dramatic in amount may be the most important factor in determining whether liability should be imposed at all." Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur - The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchaseand Sale
Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 427 (1968). See note 62 and accompanying text infra.
62 Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
The Sixth Circuit held that insider trading on the open market does not cause injury to
other persons. 542 F.2d at 323. The court held that the causation-in-fact test defined by the
Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), was
limited to cases where the defendants' conduct directly induced the plaintiffs to trade. 542
F.2d at 320. The motivating factor behind this decision seems to be the court's unwillingness to impose unlimited damages on the defendants. Id. at 320-21.
'3 Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under The Federal Securities Laws:
The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. REV. 891, 892 (1977). In four recent cases, the Supreme
Court, relying solely on the language and legislative history of section 10b and rule 10b-5,
has severely curtailed the use of rule 10b-5 as a private remedy.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that an action
under rule 10b-5 does not lie in the absence of scienter on the part of the defendant. Id. at
193. This case overruled earlier circuit court cases which had held that negligence was sufficient. E.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
the Court held that offerees who were discouraged from purchasing securities by an overly
pessimistic prospectus had no standing to bring an action under rule 10b-5. Id. at 727, 75152. Instead, the Court held, the plaintiff class was limited to purchasers and sellers. Id. at
749; see note 26 and accompanying text supra. In Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977), the Court narrowed further the construction of rule 10b-5, holding that fraudulent conduct alone, absent a misrepresentation or nondisclosure, is insufficient to maintain a
cause of action under the rule. Id. at 470-72. Lastly, in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980), the Court held that the disclose or abstain rule does not apply absent a fiduciary
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made to eliminate implied private 10b-5 actions on the basis of
excessive imposition of damages. Nevertheless, the Court's view of
implied causes of action generally has narrowed, allowing them
only when a specific intent on the part of Congress to create such a
remedy can be discerned. 4 Since such evidence of intent is scarce
with respect to rule 10b-5,15 disgorgement properly removes the irritant of "Draconian" damages, an irritant which might otherwise
prompt the Supreme Court to dismiss the private 10b-5 cause of
action.
CONCLUSION

Prior to adopting a disgorgement measure of damages, the
relationship between the parties. Id. at 233-35.
Taken together, these cases may represent the beginning of the end of the private right
of action under rule 10b-5, "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn," 421 U.S. at 737, because the Court may soon begin to look at the legislative
intent of the rule itself to see if a cause of action was ever intended. See notes 64-65 and
accompanying text infra.
"4 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979). In Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court outlined a four-part test to be used to determine whether a
cause of action could be implied from a statute:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of a class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted?' . . . Second, is there any indication of legislative intent . . to create
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy? . . . [F]inally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law . . . so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Recently in Touche Ross, however, the Court narrowed this test, stating that all Cort
factors were not necessarily to be given equal weight. 442 U.S. at 575. Instead, the "central
inquiry" must be "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a
private cause of action." Id. The Court suggested that the other three elements of the Cort
test were relevant to the issue of intent. Id. at 575-76. See generally Note, The Suitability
Rule: Should a Private Right of Action Exist? 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493 (1981). Although it
seemed doubtful that civil liability under rule 10b-5 would be able to withstand this analysis, recently in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d
342 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court applied the Cort test and concluded that an implied cause of
action did exist. Id. at 351-54. The court, however, did not find that Congress specifically
intended to create such a remedy. Id. at 352. Instead, the court based its decision on the
fact that there was no indication that Congress "meant" to deny one. Id. at 352. This is
contrary to recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on this subject. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) ("[t]he dispositive question remains
whether Congress intended to create any such [private] remedy").
65 The Supreme Court has stated that rule 10b-5 "does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the commission . . . contemplated such a remedy." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57
Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 642-43 (1963).
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Elkind court carefully considered the practical consequences of
other damage measures used by the courts to assess private plaintiff recoveries under rule 10b-5. Nonetheless, it is suggested that
the court improperly focused upon the excessive damages potentially wrought by implied private 10b-5 causes of action. Predicated upon such a focus, disgorgement ultimately may harm the
investing public because it eliminates much of the incentive for
private 10b-5 actions, thereby removing the most serious threat to
insiders contemplating the misuse of inside information.
William K. Sanders

